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Abstract 
A relevance, distinctiveness and plausibility (RDP) analysis is a conceptual 
framework that can be used to identify when potential confounds are a 
problem for interpreting experimental results. We illustrate this analysis using 
the creation or enhancement of natural group identity by the means of priming 
manipulations as employed in the experiments of five target papers. Such 
priming manipulations may lead to experimenter demand effects and may 
spuriously induce behavior change. Using a RDP analysis, we show how these 
potential confounds are likely to be problematic for all but one of the target 
papers.  
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1. Introduction 
This methodological paper briefly summarizes and then applies a relevance, distinctiveness 
and plausibility (RDP) analysis (Zizzo, 2011), to consider one potential experimental confound 
present in a growing and influential set of papers on the role of specific natural group identities for 
economic behavior.  
There are many possible definition of experimental confounds starting from John Stuart Mill 
when he writes that, in an experiment, “none of the circumstances which we do know shall have 
effects susceptible of being confounded with those of the agents whose properties we wish to study” 
(Mill, 1843/2009, p. 558; for two other definitions, see Patten, 2007, and Jackson, 2008). We can 
state that experimental confounds are any factors that ‘confound’, i.e. make unclear, the 
interpretation of experimental results connected to a particular claim made in relation to some 
experimental objective. A RDP analysis provides a framework to be able to evaluate whether 
potential confounds are indeed a problem based on their relevance, distinctiveness and plausibility. 
That is, it helps us think about whether, based on these dimensions, they are actual confounds we 
should be worried about. Admittedly, and as noted in Zizzo (2011), the number of potential 
confounds can in principle be very large if not logically infinite due to Duhem-Quine type of 
reasoning (see Smith, 1994). While this is true in principle, in practice the number of plausible, 
relevant and distinctive confounds will typically be a finite list (see Guala, 2002, for a parallel 
argument). While the RDP analysis is simply a framework to evaluate specific confounds and 
experimental objectives based on the body of knowledge available at any given point in time, it is 
fully compatible with an error elimination process by which experimental knowledge progressively 
grows (e.g., Mayo, 1996, and Mayo and Spanos, 2006). Furthermore, as long as appropriate 
qualifications are made to the claim being made and thus to the experimental objective, a RDP 
analysis does not necessarily mean that such a list needs to be exhausted in order for a result to be 
publishable. 
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As a way of introduction to the specific area of application we shall apply a RDP analysis to 
in this paper, consider the experiment by Benjamin et al. (2010) recently published in the American 
Economic Review. The stated objective of this paper is to show “the effect of ethnic, racial, and 
gender category norms on time and risk preferences” (Benjamin et al., 2010, p. 1914). A second, 
more ambitious implicit objective is that group identities of this kind can be important and therefore 
it is meaningful to consider their effect on time and risk preferences; that this is the case is made 
clear by the first sentence of the conclusion, which has the claim that “our results suggest that social 
identity affects fundamental economic preferences” (Benjamin et al., 2010, p. 1925). Natural group 
identity is either created or enhanced in the experiment by the means of a questionnaire where, for 
example, subjects are asked to identify their race and then reflect on living with roommates of either 
the same or a different race.1 This is an illustration of what in psychology is called a priming 
manipulation: a way of nudging behavior by raising (conscious and/or unconscious) awareness of a 
given dimension when the decision maker evaluates a situation (see Bargh, 2006, for a recent 
review of the social psychological literature on priming, with a stress on the unconscious 
dimension). 
There are two problems – potential confounds -, with doing this and then making a claim on 
the importance of group identity for economic preferences. One such potential confound, which we 
label C1 in the rest of this paper, is that subjects are simply implicitly complying with what they 
expect the experimental environment to demand from them. That is, there is a potential 
experimenter demand effect (Zizzo, 2010). A second potential confound, which we label C2 in the 
rest of this paper, is more basic: if social identity really matters for economic behavior, why is 
                                                 
1 One may say that it is not possible to create a natural group identity, since either someone belongs to a natural group 
or one does not. For example, one either belongs or does not belong to the natural group of people with blue eyes. 
However, that one can descriptively be classified as belonging to a group does not mean that such group has any 
psychological significance to a subject. The fact that I have blue eyes does not mean that I attach any psychological 
meaning to this or to the set of people with blue eyes. Because of this, if a group identity does not exist psychologically 
ex ante, it is possible for one to be created psychologically by the means of suitable priming.  
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priming needed for finding behavioral differences? That is to say, the priming itself may act as a 
confound relative to the claim made by Benjamin et al. (2010). In a RDP framework, what we need 
to do is to evaluate the relevance, distinctiveness and plausibility of these two potential confounds, 
as applicable to this as well as in other papers. Specifically, we shall also be focusing on Hoff and 
Pandey (2006), Afridi et al. (2010), Chen et al. (2010) and Li et al. (2011). All of these papers use 
natural group priming in key treatments. 
Section 2 briefly presents the RDP conceptual framework, section 3 applies this framework 
to the inducement of natural group identity as employed by the recent experimental research, and 
section 4 concludes. 
 
2. A RDP Framework for Evaluating Experimental Confounds 
This section briefly summarizes the key elements of the RDP framework as developed in 
more detail in Zizzo (2011), which also considers a number of examples. Consider an experimental 
objective A and a potential confound B.2 
Relevance. The relevance of an experimental confound lies in the functional relationship 
between A and B: between the experimental objective and the potential confound. Specifically, it 
depends on whether A and B are orthogonal, work in opposite direction or work in the same 
direction. B works in the same direction as A (same direction relevance) if it implies actions or 
outcomes that go systematically in the direction of the experimental actions or outcomes implied by 
the experimental objectives. This is the case of potential concern. If, conversely, A and B imply 
actions or outcomes that go systematically in the opposite direction (contrary relevance), then, 
                                                 
2 We take experimental objectives as givens in this paper and so are not focused on the triangular relationship involving 
experiments, models and the real world, as referred to for example in Guala (2005), Jones (2008) and Sitzia and Sugden 
(2011). There are two qualifications. First, and as noted in Zizzo (2011), if A entails saying something about a real 
world domain or institution, the external validity of the experiment is important as the potential confound may affect 
such external validity. Second, if the potential confound turns out to be a problem based on a RDP analysis, one 
possible response is to modify an experimental objective. 
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unless there is a finding of no significance in which case we do not know its source, we should not 
be concerned, for if there is evidence for A then this holds notwithstanding B. Similarly, if A and B 
are not systematically related in terms of actions or outcomes (i.e., they are orthogonal), there is no 
problem. A final argument to consider is one of magnifying glass relevance. It goes as follows. If B 
artificially implements in the laboratory the equivalent of a real world feature of the domain to 
which the experiment is meant to apply to, then B would help enhance external validity and thus 
help identify how A would operate in the relevant real world domain. We shall see an example of 
this in section 3. 
Distinctiveness. The potential confound B needs to be distinct from the objective A in order 
for it to be a potential problem. We shall see a partial example of identity in section 3. 
Plausibility. The potential confound B needs to have a minimum degree of plausibility in 
order for it to be a problem. This can rely on any available evidence, direct or indirect, or failing 
that, it can be based on the available evidence at a given point in time, to reach a judgment about the 
plausibility of B relative to objective A. As stated in Zizzo (2011), the judgments employed in a 
RDP evaluation of a potential confound are judgments operating at a given point in time and are not 
meant to preclude research which may change, even radically, those judgments in future RDP 
evaluations. For example, B may appear irrelevant to A but, in the light of new research, this may 
change; or what may be seen as plausible today may, in the light of new research, be shown to be 
implausible, or vice versa. 
Taking stock of the analysis. The RDP analysis suggests that, if a potential confound B is 
relevant, distinctive and plausible, and relevance may not be adequately defended as magnifying 
glass relevance (i.e., it is problematic), then there is a problem that needs to be addressed.3 
                                                 
3 In terms of the common dichotomy between internal validity and external validity of experiments, we could say that 
the confound makes the interpretation of the experimental data problematic, thus invalidating internal validity, and may 
also spoil the external validity of the experiment if A entails saying something about a real world domain or institution. 
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Depending on the case, it can be addressed by re-designing the experiments; collecting more data or 
running additional statistical analysis; or by dropping or appropriately modifying the experimental 
objective A. 
 
3. A RDP Analysis 
We consider five target papers in our analysis: Hoff and Pandey (2006), Afridi et al. (2010), 
Chen et al. (2010) and Li et al. (2011) as well as Benjamin et al. (2010), which we have already 
reviewed in the introduction. Our goal is to verify how the experiments described in these target 
papers fare when a RDP analysis is applied to them in the context of two specific potential 
confounds, which we have labeled as C1 (experimenter demand effects) and C2 (spurious creation 
or enhancement of natural group identity) as they may originate from natural group category 
priming. 
Experimental objectives and inducement of group identity. Hoff and Pandey (2006) was an 
experiment with Indian villages children aimed to look at the effect of stereotype threat in the 
context of task performance. In the key treatments, various bits of information for each child were 
publicly announced, including the caste, and they had to confirm this verbally. This was in the 
presence of other same caste status children or in the presence of mixed caste groups. Again in the 
context of task performance, Afridi et al. (2010) ran an experiment in Beijing with Chinese children 
with either high (i.e., city) or low (i.e., rural) household registration status. Their objective was “to 
investigate the causal impact of social identity on individuals’ response to economic incentives” (p. 
2). Before undergoing a Hoff and Pandey (2006) type of manipulation of publically revealing the 
group each child belonged to, the children had to answer a questionnaire to prime either their city or 
rural identity (i.e., they were asked whether they considered themselves Beijing locals). In their 
natural group treatment, Li et al. (2011) again primed group natural identity by the means of a 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Note that this argument does not rely on us believing in a trade-off between internal validity and external validity; for a 
criticism that such a trade-off is as usually envisaged, see Jimenez-Buedo and Miller (2010). 
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questionnaire, in this case comparing and contrasting one’s own college major with that of others; 
their goal was argue for role of group identity on oligopoly market behavior. Chen et al. (2010) 
argued for the significance of natural identities such as being either Asian or Caucasian on 
cooperation in five Prisoner’s Dilemma games. They again used a suitable questionnaire as a 
priming manipulation, and, on top of this and between rounds of play, they showed pictures of 
China for five second in relation to Asian subjects and pictures of Europe for five seconds in 
relation to Caucasian subjects. Such pictures “were pretested to establish that they primed the 
appropriate identities” (p. 9). 
Relevance. In principle, both C1 and C2 have same direction relevance as they imply 
behavior that would be in the same direction as that entailed by the experimental objectives of the 
target papers, therefore potentially confounding the interpretation of the results. An experimenter 
demand (C1) would operate through enhancing behavioral conformity to expectations associated to 
group identity in general or with reference to norms or stereotypes associated with specific groups. 
Priming manipulations (C2) would operate, more fundamentally, at the level of enhancing or even 
creating the group identity that is alleged to be responsible for behavioral change as identified by 
the target papers. 
A magnifying glass relevance argument could however be made in relation to Hoff and 
Pandey (2006). The priming, and any associated experimenter demand, could be thought of as 
artificially modeling cases where stereotype threat is present in the real world for Indian 
schoolchildren; insofar as the objective of the experiment is to identify the effects of stereotype 
threat, then, if we believe that such stereotype threat is a real world problem, the experimenter 
demand works as a magnifying glass enabling us to capture its effects.  
Distinctiveness. Both C1 (experimenter demand effects) and C2 (making group identity 
matter through priming) are distinctive from the objectives of all five of the papers. The only 
potential partial exception is in the case of Hoff and Pandey (2006): the public announcements, 
insofar as they induce experiment demand, are a form of social pressure and per se a source of 
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stereotype threat, which is the object of investigation of this paper; therefore, one could argue that 
there is at least a partial identity between C1 and the experimental objective. 
Plausibility. We begin from C1, which is arguably comparatively more difficult to evaluate. 
It is plausible to think that public announcements by an authority to children may have led the low 
status children of Hoff and Pandey (2006) and Afridi et al. (2010) to feel they should take the 
reminder of their status seriously.  
However, since Hoff and Pandey (2006) have a control treatment with same caste children 
and public announcement as well as a treatment with mixed caste children and public 
announcement, they are able to provide relevant evidence regarding the effect they are interested in 
versus the experimenter demand implied by the public announcement.  
There is no such control treatment in Afridi et al. (2010). Furthermore, C1 is at least as 
plausible or probably more plausible in Afridi et al. (2010) as they combined the public 
announcement with a priming questionnaire. 
With a university student sample, Benjamin et al. (2010) claim to have direct evidence 
against an experimenter demand effect interpretation of the effect of their questionnaire priming 
since (in a part of their experiment) they asked subjects the objective of the experiment post-
experimentally and could not find support for an interpretation in terms of experimenter demand 
effect from that. Post-experimental questions or questionnaires of this kind are problematic, 
however, as what people say has often very little to do with the implicit cognitive mechanisms that 
underlie priming (that is, there is a dissociation between implicit and explicit knowledge: Shanks 
and St John 1994); if we believe that C1 holds, it would hold even more for post-experimental 
questions or questionnaires of this kind; and there are experimenter demand effects which are not 
related directly to conforming to the perceived wishes of the experimenter, but are rather purely 
cognitive, i.e. they simply follow from the process by which subjects employ whatever cues are 
given in an unfamiliar decision problem to make sense of it (Zizzo, 2010). 
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The plausibility of C1 is likely to be at least as high or higher for Chen et al. (2010) than for 
Benjamin et al. (2010). This is true for two reasons: first, the social (interactive) dimension of Chen 
et al. (2010) games relative to the individual choice tasks of Benjamin et al. (2010); second, and 
more significantly, the presence of the pictures priming to combine and interact with the 
questionnaire priming.  
In relation to C2, the analysis is more straightforward. The plausibility of the priming 
having an effect which otherwise would not have been obtained lies in the fact, which the authors of 
the target papers would not dispute, that in all of these papers it did seem to have some effect. 
Pulling the analysis together. We can now summarize how the papers fare based on a RDP 
analysis of C1 and C2, where C2 appears to be a more unequivocal problem than C1. To repeat, in 
order for a potential confound to be a problem (and outside the realm of contrary relevance which is 
not relevant here), it needs simultaneously to satisfy conditions of same direction relevance, of 
distinctiveness and of some minimum threshold of plausibility. 
Hoff and Pandey (2006) is the paper that appears most in the clear based on a RDP analysis. 
On the relevance dimension, a magnifying glass relevance argument can be employed to defend it 
against C1; on the distinctiveness dimension, there is at least a partial overlap between experimental 
objective and both C1 and C2; and on the plausibility dimension, there is evidence that appears 
difficult to explain in terms of C1. It is instructive to understand what makes this paper a good one 
to handle C1 and possibly C2 as well: it not only benefits from an extra control treatment (which 
helps on the plausibility dimension), but also from an appropriately qualified experimental objective 
(which helps on the relevance and distinctiveness dimensions). 
The other papers are not equally cautious in what they claim and this contributes to C1 and 
C2 being problems (that is, actual confounds). It is then incumbent on researchers to think of 
possible responses to these problems.  
One possible response that would handle both C1 and C2 would be to run additional 
treatments showing that there are effects of the kind predicted even without the priming 
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manipulation. A less satisfactory response that would however at least help handle C1 would be to 
run treatments that provide at least some partial control for experimenter demand effects, e.g. via 
behavioral tasks or appropriate psychological questionnaires (for recent examples, see Hargreaves 
Heap and Zizzo, 2011; Zafar, 2011; or Zizzo and Fleming, 2011). 
With the current data, one would need to either drop the affected experimental objectives or 
modify the experimental objectives to make them more congruent with what has actually been 
shown. Li et al. (2011) have a treatment with an artificial group manipulation rather than a natural 
group manipulation, and so formulating objectives in terms of natural group manipulations could be 
dropped entirely in favor of making the paper stand purely on the artificial group manipulation.4 In 
the case of Benjamin et al. (2010), the experiment does not show the effects of specific natural 
groups norms on time and risk preferences, let alone an effect on ‘fundamental economic 
preferences’, but, if we reformulate the experimental objective to one of how stereotype threat 
affects time and risk preferences for specific natural group categories, and if one buys the 
magnifying glass relevance argument that such stereotype threat may indeed be one that exists for 
people making time and risk preferences decisions in the real world the paper does provide 
information about this, then the paper is informative insofar as this more modest objective is 
concerned. In the case of Afridi et al. (2010), conditional on the presence of a possible experimenter 
demand effect that may or may not have magnifying glass relevance but which is expected to be 
stronger than in Hoff and Pandey (2006), we could again frame the experimental objective in terms 
of effect of a stereotype threat on behavior, though what we might say about this remains weaker 
than in Hoff and Pandey (2006) due to the lack of an additional treatment and the stronger nature of 
the priming manipulation. The especially strong nature of the manipulation in Chen et al. (2010) 
makes drawing inferences from this paper difficult, but whatever information there is could again 
be framed purely in terms of stereotype threat. 
 
                                                 
4 We do not engage in a RDP analysis of artificial group manipulations in this paper. 
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4. Conclusions 
A relevance, distinctiveness and plausibility (RDP) analysis is a conceptual framework that 
can be used to identify when potential confounds may be a problem for the experimental objectives, 
and, if they are a problem, what are valid or less valid ways of addressing objections based on such 
confounds. Potential confounds are assessed against experimental objectives in terms of their 
relevance, distinctiveness and plausibility. We illustrated this analysis using the creation or 
enhancement of natural group identity by the means of priming manipulations in the experiments of 
five target papers. These manipulations lead to two potential experimental confounds, namely 
experimenter demand effects and the fact that it may spuriously enhance or even create natural 
group identity and thus lead to behavior change where none or little would be expected in the real 
world with such natural categories. Using a RDP analysis, we showed how these potential 
confounds are likely to be problematic for all but one of the target papers, and identified ways 
forward.  
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